

Sleeping Giants - Activating Dormant Java Deserialization Gadget Chains through Stealthy Code Changes

Bruno Kreyszig
Umeå University
Umeå, Sweden
bruno.kreyszig@umu.se

Sabine Houy
Umeå University
Umeå, Sweden
sabine.houy@umu.se

Timothée Riom
Umeå University
Umeå, Sweden
timothee.riom@umu.se

Alexandre Bartel
Umeå University
Umeå, Sweden
alexandre.bartel@cs.umu.se

Abstract

Java deserialization gadget chains are a well-researched critical software weakness. The vast majority of known gadget chains rely on gadgets from software dependencies. Furthermore, it has been shown that small code changes in dependencies have enabled these gadget chains. This makes gadget chain detection a purely reactive endeavor. Even if one dependency's deployment pipeline employs gadget chain detection, a gadget chain can still result from gadgets in other dependencies. In this work, we assess how likely small code changes are to enable a gadget chain. These changes could either be accidental or intentional as part of a supply chain attack. Specifically, we show that class serializability is a strongly fluctuating property over a dependency's evolution. Then, we investigate three change patterns by which an attacker could stealthily introduce gadgets into a dependency. We apply these patterns to 533 dependencies and run three state-of-the-art gadget chain detectors both on the original and the modified dependencies. The tools detect that applying the modification patterns can activate/inject gadget chains in 26.08% of the dependencies we selected. Finally, we verify the newly detected chains. As such, we identify dormant gadget chains in 53 dependencies that could be added through minor code modifications. This both shows that Java deserialization gadget chains are a broad liability to software and proves dormant gadget chains as a lucrative supply chain attack vector.

CCS Concepts

• **Software and its engineering** → **Software defect analysis; Software libraries and repositories**; • **Security and privacy** → **Software reverse engineering**.

Keywords

Java, Deserialization, Serializable, Gadget Chain, Software Supply Chain, Dependency, Bug Injection

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1 Introduction

The native Java serialization API has a long history of being error-prone and vulnerable. By now it has been ten years since *Frohoff* [19] first addressed the inherent security cost induced to Java applications by the *Serializable* API. Specifically, being able to exploit the object-oriented nature of Java's native serialization in code reuse attacks, i.e., gadget chains, has garnered much attention from the research community. Starting with *Serialanalyzer* [3] and *GadgetInspector* [24], numerous gadget chain detection tools [6, 8–10, 12, 32, 35, 37, 39, 40, 56, 59, 65, 72] and remediation strategies [13, 14, 57, 75] have been developed.

Yet, despite substantial efforts and initiatives to replace the *Serializable* API with a more secure data-driven mechanism [2, 20–22], it seems to be here to stay. For instance, *Android*'s inter-app communication continues to rely on native Java serialization [32] and since 2020, 55 new critical vulnerabilities were published in the *National Vulnerability Database*¹ [43]. All the while, *Ysoserial* [18] – the point of reference for Java deserialization gadget chains – has grown stale (last gadget chain added in February 2021). With continuous software evolution, *Ysoserial* is losing relevance regarding gadget chains in current software. It has been shown that the occurrence of deserialization gadget chains is related to minor code changes [30, 60], such as adding the *Serializable* interface to a class. Over a Java dependency's evolution, these small changes make a gadget chain appear or disappear. Thus, if a gadget chain detection tool fails to find a gadget chain in the latest version of a dependency, it is no guarantee that gadget chains will not surface in the future. Neither that it may already exist through a combination of dependencies. This makes gadget chain detection in its current state a reactive process. In this work, instead of asking whether a dependency contains gadget chains, we analyze how close a dependency is to containing a gadget chain.

First, we highlight the volatility of Java class serializability over a dependency's evolution by downloading 1 475 widely used dependencies from *Maven*, constituting 111 275 versions. We compare how many classes are serializable in each version and whether changes in serializability occur through direct addition of the serializable interface or transitively through a supertype. In particular, the latter case provides valuable insights into the use of gadget chains in a supply chain attack. While it may be obvious in code reviews that a concrete class containing sensitive method calls should not become serializable, a maintainer could miss that making an interface serializable also impacts subtypes.

¹Using the *Common Weakness* identifier CWE-502, 'Java' as a keyword and a CVSS V3 score of ≥ 9 .

This is one of the three modification patterns we investigate, through which either an attacker could stealthily inject or a developer unintentionally add gadgets into a dependency. We apply these changes to the 533 dependencies from the dataset above, which contain at least one serializable class. On both the original and modified dependencies, we run three recent representative gadget chain detection tools: *Tabby* [12], *Crystallizer* [65] and *AndroChain* [32]. This allows us to map gadget chains reported in the modified version, but not the original, as related to the applied modifications. As such, we find that for 26.08% of the dependencies, the modifications lead to more gadget chain detections. Then, through manual analysis, we confirm dormant gadget chains in 53 of these dependencies. 49.06% of the true positives required only one of our modification patterns.

Our work highlights that even if Java deserialization gadget chains are not a liability to software dependencies in their current state [32], in many cases, it is feasible to activate these dormant gadget chains either by accident or through a targeted supply chain attack. To make matters worse, maintainers have no control over gadgets from other dependencies, which can be leveraged as a deserialization gadget chain in conjunction with their artifact. It implies the necessity to be aware of partial (dormant) gadget chains so one can remediate these weaknesses before they become a vulnerability. Our main contributions are:

- A study of Java serializability usage over dependency evolution. This also leads us to define four dependency datasets as a basis for future research on Java gadget chains.
- The concept of *dormant gadget chains* as a novel supply chain attack vector (and technical debt) with three attack patterns by which gadgets can be injected into dependencies.
- A feasibility analysis of this attack on 533 dependencies, using three gadget chain detection tools to locate injected chains and manual analysis for verification.
- A ground truth of 53 dependencies with dormant gadget chains, verified through manual analysis.

2 Background

2.1 Java Deserialization Gadget Chains

A Java deserialization gadget chain describes a sequence of method calls leading from a deserialization entry point to a security-sensitive method. To be clear, the term *entry point* is overloaded. It first represents an insecure *ObjectInputStream* calling *readObject()* which triggers deserialization of an arbitrary object. For instance, in CVE-2024-45772 [42] (see Listing 1), *Apache Lucene*'s HTTP client² implementation would, on receiving a bad response code, attempt to recover the cause from the failed response. One could assume that the object being reconstructed from the stream at line 5 must be of the type *Throwable* to not violate the cast. However, the entire reconstruction, i.e., deserialization, occurs before the cast. This is precisely where a gadget chain payload is triggered.

Research [29, 32, 52] and recent vulnerabilities (e.g., Listing 1) show that such entry points continue to exist in software. Given the existence of deserialization entry points, we shift our attention for the remainder of this work to entry points for deserialization

```

1 protected void throwKnownError(HttpResponse res, StatusLine s){
2     ObjectInputStream in = null;
3     in = new ObjectInputStream(res.getEntity().getContent());
4     try {
5         Throwable t = (Throwable) in.readObject();
6     } catch (Throwable th) { /*...*/ }
7 }

```

Listing 1: CVE-2024-45772 [42]: insecure deserialization entry point in *Apache Lucene*'s *HttpClientBase*.

gadget chains. Serializable Java objects may override any of the default deserialization methods *readObject*, *readResolve*, and *readObjectNoData* to implement custom deserialization logic. A prime example of this is Java's hashed dictionaries, e.g., *HashMap* and *HashTable*. Serialized instances of these types are inherently required to recalculate the hash values of their keys since the hashing implementation depends on native code on the operating system a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) is running on. Consider Listing 2, where from *readObject()* (line 2), keys and values are read from the stream (lines 7 and 8), and then the keys' hashes are calculated before placing them in the table (line 12). The resulting call to an arbitrary *Object.hashCode()* is no reason for concern in itself. However, it unlocks additional gadgets to integrate into the chain.

```

1 class HashTable<K,V> implements Map<K,V>, Serializable {
2     private void readObject(ObjectInputStream s) {
3         readHashTable(s);}
4     void readHashTable(ObjectInputStream s) {
5         int elements = s.readInt();
6         for (; elements > 0; elements--) {
7             K key = (K)s.readObject();
8             V value = (V)s.readObject();
9             reconstitutionPut(table, key, value);
10        }
11    private void reconstitutionPut(Entry[] t, K key, V value) {
12        int hash = key.hashCode();
13        // put value/hash in table ...
14    }

```

Listing 2: Java's *HashTable* [45] deserialization. The highlighted lines show the gadget chain to *Object.hashCode()*.

Gadgets like *Object.hashCode()*, which both open up many further polymorphic call sites and are reachable through classes in the Java Class Library (JCL), are commonly referred to as **trampoline gadgets** [56]. In *YsoSerial* 22 of 34 deserialization gadget chain payloads rely on a trampoline gadget [18, 32]. This is an important observation to make, as it shows that already making more trampoline gadgets reachable can activate currently dormant gadget chains. We demonstrate this with a motivating example.

2.2 Motivating Example

Consider the *DisposableBeanAdapter* [63] in the *spring-beans* dependency in Listing 3. The *Method.invoke()* (line 23) is a security-sensitive sink as it allows invoking an arbitrary method via reflection. A gadget chain *.run()* → *.destroy()* → *.invokeCustomDestroyMethod()* → *Method.invoke()* is not found by gadget chain detection tools since *run()* is not reachable for an arbitrary subtype of *Runnable*.

However, this *dormant gadget chain* can be activated by introducing a new gadget either into the *spring-beans* dependency itself or

²<https://github.com/apache/lucene/commit/b4b153f64fb0420c6e28ddea4c442e119458756c>

```

1 package org.springframework.beans.factory.support;
2 class DisposableBeanAdapter implements Runnable, Serializable {
3     private final Object bean;
4     private final String beanName;
5     private String [] destroyMethodNames;
6
7     @Override
8     public void run() { destroy(); }
9     public void destroy() {
10        // irrelevant lines omitted
11        else if (this.destroyMethodNames != null) {
12            for (String destroyMethodName : this.destroyMethodNames){
13                Method destroyMethod =
14                    determineDestroyMethod(destroyMethodName);
15                if (destroyMethod != null)
16                    invokeCustomDestroyMethod(destroyMethod);
17            }
18        }
19        private void invokeCustomDestroyMethod(Method destroyMethod){
20            int paramCount = destroyMethod.getParameterCount();
21            Object[] args = new Object[paramCount];
22            ReflectionUtils.makeAccessible(destroyMethod);
23            Object returnValue = destroyMethod.invoke(this.bean, args);
24            // remaining lines omitted
25        }

```

Listing 3: Dormant deserialization gadget chain in *spring-beans*' `DisposableBeanAdapter` [63]. Given the reachability of `Runnable.run()` through any serializable class on the class-path, the gadget chain can be activated.

into any other dependency being used by a software project relying on *spring-beans*. Listing 4 shows a gadget deliberately crafted for this cause. With `hashCode()` being a trampoline gadget, the call to `Runnable.run()` at line 7 can be invoked through deserialization. An attacker could assign a `DisposableBeanAdapter` (Listing 3) to the `hashCodeGen` field of the gadget in Listing 4 and serialize it to create a malicious payload. Note how the gadget is further concealed since the `Runnable` property `hashCodeGen` is declared as `final`, thus suggesting the field cannot be arbitrarily assigned. Yet, Java deserialization bypasses default constructors and thereby allows setting final fields during deserialization [21].

```

1 class HypocriteSerializable implements Serializable {
2     private int hashCode = 0;
3     private final Runnable hashCodeGen = new Runnable() {
4         public void run() { /*...*/ }
5     };
6     public int hashCode() {
7         if (this.hashCode == 0) hashCodeGen.run();
8         return this.hashCode;
9     }

```

Listing 4: Gadget making `Runnable.run()` reachable.

This example gives evidence of why dormant Java deserialization gadget chains make for a lucrative supply chain attack target. An attacker has ample opportunities to hide code that activates the chain. Moreover, the code additions are in a class or dependency unrelated to the vulnerable gadget that is being targeted.

2.3 Software Supply Chain Threats

The software supply chain comprises all dependencies, tools, and deployment infrastructure to build and deliver a piece of software. High-profile incidents like *SolarWinds* [51], *Log4Shell* [17] or *XZ*

Utils [41] showed how such supply chain components can compromise many downstream targets. Specifically, when looking at the two recent cases, *Log4Shell* and *XZ Utils*, it highlights (1) widely used dependencies as the weak link in the supply chain and (2) that a compromise may occur accidentally or deliberately. In the same way, an exploitable deserialization gadget could be introduced with or without intention. Either way, the closer a dormant gadget chain is to becoming a real chain, the more likely a code change activating it is going to be unnoticed.

A previous work [73] assessed the feasibility of adding small code changes to turn immature into real vulnerabilities. While we distance ourselves from their research³, we acknowledge that its concept is instructive to our work. In [73], the authors searched the *Linux* kernel for immature *Use-After-Free* (UAF) vulnerabilities and showed how to activate those through stealthy code changes. By analogy, we search for incomplete (dormant) gadget chains (as in Listing 3) and evaluate the effort to turn those into a full deserialization gadget chain. Of course, these changes should also be stealthy. Java's *Serializable* API has been criticized as being opaque [21, 22], which has some potential to hide gadgets. Further, one viable way of creating more gadgets is to introduce the *Serializable* interface to existing classes, thus turning them into gadgets [60]. For this reason, we investigate how the usage of Java's *Serializable* evolves in dependencies over time.

3 Evolution of Java's Serializable Interface

We describe our analysis pipeline towards a representative and comprehensive view for Java's *Serializable* API usage in dependencies over time and versions. To this end, we build a two-stage pipeline (see Figure 1) to first obtain a clean mapping of dependency download URLs, versions, and release dates. Then, we forward the URLs by dependency to static analysis to both analyze *Serializable* usage over time and versions as well as the reasons for these changes. The first stage is implemented in *Python* in 550 lines of code and the second stage in *Java* on top of *SootUp* [28] in 201 lines of code.

3.1 Data Collection and Cleaning

3.1.1 Data Source Definition. The naive approach to collecting a dataset of Java dependencies would be to crawl the *Maven Central* repository root. However, this practice leads to an unrepresentative dataset and is also wasteful:

- The repository listing gives no indication of dependency usage.
- It is hard to filter out dependencies that are unlikely to be included during runtime (e.g., test and build dependencies).
- Dependencies can get relocated within the repository listing. For instance, *javax.servlet-api* is moved to *javax.servlet-api* and later *jakarta.servlet-api*. Such relations are crucial to produce a coherent dependency evolution history. This information is also not stored in the now six-year-old *Maven Dependency Graph* by research [4].
- The *Maven Central* repository alone comprises 51.9 TB. Taking into account all repositories listed through *Maven*, it is 202 TB.

Instead, we start from the *mvnrepository.com* web interface, which provides usage statistics, relocation information, and a dependency

³The publication was retracted due to unapproved human-subject research [25].




Figure 1: Serialization evolution dependency download and analysis pipeline. The blue letters (a-c) refer to intermediary artifacts: (a) all downloadable dependencies, (b) cleaned and remapped relocations, and (c) enriched with serializable changes.

categorization. To our knowledge, there is no convenient API to retrieve this data, so we must resort to scraping it from the user-oriented web front. As such, we compromise with two further challenges: request rate limiting and an incomplete query mechanism for dependency popularity. The latter is caused by the `/popular` endpoint (see Figure 1) only paginating to page 20. Given that each page contains 10 dependency entries, this would limit us to only the 200 most used dependencies. Therefore, we additionally query all category based listings, setting a minimum usage of 100 as a threshold to filter out less popular dependencies⁴.

3.1.2 Web Scraping. We preliminarily filter version tags indicating non-release versions (e.g., *beta*, *alpha*, *rc*). Note that during data cleaning we will more thoroughly remove such versions. At this stage, however, we only want to reduce the number of web requests. Further, we cannot retrieve the exact download URL by visiting all the version links on *mvnrepository.com* due to the website’s request rate limiting. Instead, we construct a download URL (see Appendix A) where the repository is one of eleven repository base URLs. Most artifacts are hosted on the *Maven Central* repository. The remaining ten repositories are fallbacks for certain categories. For instance, the *Google Maven* repository hosts many *Android* dependencies that are not stored on *Maven Central*. For each dependency (-version), we probe whether a dependency is hosted with a HEAD request starting from *Maven Central* and then iterating through the fallback repositories. We also try to download the dependency in *AAR (Android Archive)* format if no *JAR* is available.

Some listings refer to the same dependency, which is indicated by the *relocated* tag. We can extract this information from scraping *mvnrepository.com* and add a reference column to point to the new location of the dependency. This allows us to merge instances such as *java-servlet-api*, *javax.servlet-api*, and *jakarta.servlet-api* to a single coherent dependency. Unfortunately, the *relocation* tag is a single-linked list. If only the newer dependencies are contained in the popularity listing, the older versions cannot be retrieved.

Through the web scraping, we retrieve 1 435 unique dependency names with 119 202 version entries (see Figure 1 (a)). From here, we identify dependencies that reference a dependency relocation, but this dependency does not exist in our dataset. We resolve the missing 40 dependency relocations, adding another 6 428 versions to the dataset. Thus, the pre-data-cleaning dataset comprises 1 475 unique dependency names with 125 630 versions.

3.1.3 Data Cleaning. We recursively map dependency relocations to the latest dependency relocation’s name. This way, we can query the complete version history across relocations. Then, since our aim is to analyze Java’s *Serializable* usage over version and time, we must rigorously clean the version identifiers into a sortable scheme. Ideally, this scheme would adhere to semantic versioning [55]. However, some dependencies ignore semantic versioning entirely. For instance, *org.json* strictly uses a date format (e.g., 20250107) as a version number, which, for our purposes, is fine since it ensures correct version-based sorting. If this scheme is used only occasionally, as in the *Apache Commons Collections*, then we remove these version entries (see Table 1, row 4). After mapping relocations and version identifier cleaning, the dataset contains 1 100 unique dependencies and 111 275 version entries (see Figure 1, (b)).

Rule	Example
Release Tags	5.2.25.FINAL → 5.2.25
Alpha Tags	1.6.0-dev01 → (remove)
Char Separators	1.5R4 → 1.5.4
Date Versions ≤ 20%	[3.2.2, 3.2.1, ..., 20040616] → [3.2.2, 3.2.1, ...]
Undefined Postfix	2686.v7c37e0578401 → 2686

Table 1: Version identifier cleaning rules.

For each dependency, we iterate over all versions in the dataset and load these pairwise into two *SootUp* views. Tribute to the version name cleaning enabling correct sorting; we can not only collect the number of serializable classes in the view but also determine changes to the previous version. Specifically, we determine the cause of an in/decrease of *Serializable* classes. The three causes are depicted in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Causes (1-3, change in green) for an increase in serializable classes.

⁴The reason we cannot solely rely on the category-based listings is because a select few popular dependencies (e.g., *org.renjin.stats*) are not categorized at all.

Going from the current version v_n , its successor v_{n+1} could have (1) added a new serializable class or (2) implemented the `Serializable` interface to an existing class, which could (3) indirectly render child classes serializable. A decrease in serializable classes occurs through the inversion of the three scenarios. We enrich the cleaned dataset with the number of such change events in each dependency version.

3.2 Measuring Serialization Usage

In the following, we measure the trend for `Serializable` usage in Java dependencies over their evolution. First, we remove dependencies for which, over the entire version evolution, not a single class was serializable. This halves the dependencies to 533. For statistical analysis, we further trim dependencies that have no release in 2024 or 2025. This is especially important for evaluating the correlation of serializable class count over dependency evolution. A correlation coefficient for a dependency with only releases up to, e.g., 2016 would pollute the current trend. Hence, the dependency dataset relevant to analyzing `Serializable` evolution comprises 352 dependencies (32% of the original 1 100).

In Table 2, we investigate serialization evolution over time and dependency version separately. That is because version numbers are not necessarily congruent with the release date. For instance, the *Spring* framework will create a new major release but continue to release new minor releases for older major release versions. As an example, *spring-core v6.0.0* was released in November 2022, and thus earlier than *v5.3.39* (August '24) and *v5.2.25* (July '23).

$\rho \in$	[0.5, 1]	[0, 0.5]	[0, -0.5]	[-0.5, -1]	<i>n.a.</i>
Date	174 (49.43%)	33 (9.38%)	39 (11.08%)	37 (10.51%)	71
Version	182 (51.70%)	28 (7.95%)	34 (9.66%)	39 (11.08%)	71

Table 2: Correlation of class serializability with dependency evolution over time/version. For 71 of 352 dependencies the standard deviation is 0, i.e., no correlation can be calculated.

Table 2 shows that for dependencies which use Java’s `Serializable` interface and have recent releases, the majority has a strong *Pearson*-correlation for `Serializable` class count over time (49.43%) and version (51.70%). This set contains prominent dependencies such as *Google’s Guava* core Java libraries (Figure 3a), *Apache Dubbo* (Figure 3b), or *Spring Core* (Figure 3d). Yet, even for dependencies with a weak or negative correlation, serializable classes can fluctuate to a degree that makes it feasible to introduce new gadgets (see Figures 3e to 3j).

We also calculate the overall correlation of Java’s `Serializable` usage across dependencies. To do so, we normalize the amount of data points by year, removing dependencies that do not contain at least one dependency release for every year from 2015 to 2024. 133 dependencies satisfy this condition. For dependencies with multiple releases within one year, we select a random sample. This step is mandatory to avoid skewing the overall correlation towards dependencies with many releases (e.g., the *aws-core* dependency contains 3 407 releases). Due to random sampling, we calculate the overall correlation 100 times and take the mean of this value. As such, we find a weak positive correlation of $\rho_{all} = 0.1925$.

In addition to the number of serializable classes in each dependency version, we also track the causes for an increase/decrease

in serializable classes. We categorize the changes in Table 3. The addition or removal of a serializable class is by far the most common type of change (86.83%). Still, we find 9.36% of change events to be related to implementing the `Serializable` interface – directly or indirectly (as shown in Figure 2). These changes occur in 190 or 108 dependencies, respectively. These are also the dependencies where a change in serializability is most likely to remain unnoticed.

	Change Events (242 919)		Dependencies (352)	
	Add	Remove	Add	Remove
Class	124 424 (51.22%)	86 497 (35.61%)	275	237
Direct	14 640 (6.01%)	6 367 (2.62%)	190	109
Indirect	8 090 (3.33%)	2 901 (1.19%)	108	74

Table 3: Changes responsible for increase/decrease of serializable class count in dependencies with releases in 2024/25.

3.3 Key Observations

We analyzed the usage of Java’s `Serializable` interface over time and version in a dataset of 1 100 widely used dependencies. It leads us to (a) formulating a **key challenge to a comprehensive view** on deserialization gadget chain research and (b) implications for gadget-chain-based **supply chain attacks**. To do so, we first define four dependency datasets ($D \subset C \subset B \subset A$):

- A Gadget Providers** (533) – dependencies containing at least one serializable class.
- B Active Gadget Providers** (352) – *Gadget Providers* with a recent release in 2024/25.
- C Volatile Gadget Providers** (283) – *Active Gadget Providers* with a fluctuating amount of serializable classes over the dependency evolution (due to all causes outlined in Figure 2).
- D Volatile Stealthy Gadget Providers** (208) – *Volatile Gadget Providers* with at least one change event related to implementing/removing the `Serializable` interface to/from a class.

To increase visibility of deserialization gadget chains in Java, we must be able to search for gadget chains in the entirety of set *A* across dependencies and also across versions if dependencies are contained in set *C*. Since we continue to focus on *dormant gadget chains*, solving this challenge is out of scope for this work. However, we provide the datasets to the research community as an open research challenge (see Section 8). Although such an analysis does not eliminate gadget chains within downstream software projects, it solidifies the supply chain by providing visibility to gadget chains caused by dependencies. Also, with it, *Ysoserial* [18] can be brought to an up-to-date version.

In this work, focusing on gadget-chain-based supply chain attacks, we continue to work on dependencies in datasets *A*, *B*, and *D* individually. These are the datasets that directly map to our three gadget injection patterns. Dataset *C* is irrelevant because it would only apply to a pattern for adding new serializable classes to a target dependency. However, it is hard to formulate a universal pattern for the addition of a functionally independent class.




Figure 3: Visualization examples for serializable class count over dependency version. The x-axis represents the version index; the y-axis the number of serializable classes.

4 Activating Dormant Gadget Chains

We aim to activate currently dormant deserialization gadget chains through three modification patterns. Our approach is inspired by *FixReverter* [77] and *Hypocrite Commits* [73]. However, this work is, to the best of our knowledge, the first bug injection research dedicated to Java deserialization gadget chains.

Figure 4 outlines our automated process for gadget injection and evaluation of success rate. For each dependency in the dataset, we detect injection sites and apply three patterns (1-3, further detailed in Section 4.1). We then run gadget chain detectors on the original and modified JAR files which results in two possibly distinct outputs. The delta of detections between these outputs is a soft proof of the injection patterns' success.




Figure 4: Deserialization Gadget Injection Framework.

From there, we provide hard evidence by manually analyzing 1 990 detected (dormant) gadget chains in 126 dependencies (Section 4.4). In Section 4.5, we provide two examples highlighting how the patterns could activate a dormant gadget chain and a case showing how the pattern injection could fail.

4.1 Injection Patterns

We define code injection patterns that allow an attacker to activate dormant gadget chains in a dependency's codebase. Such modifications should follow the three constraints:

Automatability: Injection sites follow a consistent structure, allowing scalable injection in a large corpus of dependencies.

Detectability: Modifications do not hinder gadget chains from being found by existing tools. The purpose of our study is to approximate how often dormant gadget chains occur in widely used dependencies. To do so on a large scale, we must be able to leverage automated tools. Note that once injection sites have been detected, it is trivial to adjust the modification such that tools then fail to detect it. This is due to known limitations in gadget chain detection, such as handling Java Reflection [31].

Stealthiness: Changes are non-obvious from a code review perspective, e.g., emulating harmless refactoring or utility additions.

To find interesting code modifications to activate gadget chains, we first consider the patches how known gadget chains were introduced [60]. Those are the addition of a class or a method, changing access modifiers, and making an existing class serializable. Then, we also consider the design of Java's *Serializable* API itself as it violates common assumptions in Java programming [21, 48, 49]. Such inconsistencies are difficult to reason about in code review.

4.1.1 Transitive Serializability. While direct changes to class serializability may occur over a dependency's evolution, from an attacker's point of view, making a superclass or interface serializable is a more desirable, hidden approach. A good example of this is the *Apache Commons Collections'* *InvokerTransformer* and *InstantiateTransformer*. As the notorious enablers of seven *Yoserial* gadget chains, their serializability was removed in one patch⁵, leaving a warning comment to never make these classes serializable again. Under these circumstances, re-implementing the *Serializable* interface in the two classes is unlikely. However, what if the *Transformer* interface were to become serializable? Given the history of *Commons Collections* gadget chains, such a patch being accepted may still be contrived – albeit, much less than adding the *Serializable* interface directly. Now, let us consider the dependency set of *volatile stealthy gadget providers* (Section 3.3, *D*), which have

⁵<https://github.com/apache/commons-collections/commit/e585cd0433ae4cfbc56e58572b9869bd0c86b11#diff-2d13b1592fb865090f134fe9d88dee2cb2e24170a5338d5df79a495b34b207a9>

had transitive serializability changes in the past and have not been subject to gadget chain detection.

Stealthiness: A maintainer might consider the consequences of serializability to the applied class/interface itself but miss the implications to inheriting components. An attacker can leverage this to conceal their target.

Automatability: We apply the *transitive serializability* pattern by implementing the `Serializable` interface to all abstract classes and interfaces in a dependency.

Detectability: Gadget chain detectors commonly consider only serializable classes for virtual call sites. This modification, in essence, expands the search space for these tools.

4.1.2 Final Properties. A property declared as `final` may only be assigned once [46]. Taking Listing 5 as an example, one could assume the classes `NotVuln` and `Vuln` to be semantically equivalent. Yet, Java deserialization bypasses the default constructor [21], which otherwise would set `methodClass` and `methodName` (lines 7 and 8) to the given constants. This allows arbitrarily setting both `final` properties, leading to arbitrary method invocation at line 11. Note that `methodName` should not be defined as a simple string literal because, if `final`, it is considered a compile-time constant that cannot be modified [46].

```

1 class NotVuln implements Serializable{
2     public void method(Object o) {
3         Method method = OtherClass.class.getMethod("m");
4         method.invoke(o);
5     }
6 }
7 class Vuln implements Serializable{
8     private final Class methodClass = OtherClass.class;
9     private final String methodName = new String("m");
10    public void method(Object o) {
11        Method method = methodClass.getMethod(methodName);
12        method.invoke(o);
13    }

```

Listing 5: Extracting constant pool values into private final properties.

Stealthiness: A maintainer unfamiliar with the potential of setting final fields through deserialization could easily miss a malicious refactoring as in Listing 5.

Automatability: We specifically target `String` and `Class` constants used in methods and transform those into properties. We replace the LDC bytecode instruction for loading from the constant pool with an equivalent `ALOAD 0` (0 refers to this) and `GETFIELD`, which refers to the newly added final field [47]. The modification essentially allows an attacker to control constant values, opening up a broad range of security-sensitive sink methods requiring a tainted `String` or `Class`. Therefore, while we primarily target common usage patterns of the Java reflection API [36, 71], we also cover `String` constants used in, e.g., `Runtime.exec(<String>)` or custom `ClassLoaders`. Any dependency that is active in development (i.e., *B - Active Gadget Providers*) is an injection target.

Detectability: Refactoring literals into properties renders those taintable. Taint tracking is common amongst gadget chain detectors.

4.1.3 Interface Method Reachability. The aim is to introduce new trampoline gadgets into software so that a multitude of further gadgets become reachable. This relates to the common patch scenario of adding a new class or method [60].

Stealthiness: The change is difficult for maintainers to detect, especially since the caller of the new trampoline gadget could be in a different dependency. Consider a subtype of `Iterator` with an implementation of `Iterator.next()` that leads to a gadget chain. An attacker (or a developer unintentionally) could create a serializable class with a generic `Iterator` property. As long as this class coexists with the dependency containing the `Iterator-gadget` on an application's classpath, this application now contains a full deserialization gadget chain. For this reason, this pattern is applicable to all *Gadget Providers* (dataset A).

Automatability: For each serializable class in the dependency, we extract all implemented interfaces. Then, we add all interface methods related to the Java SDK API to a caller gadget (e.g., Listing 6). For an attacker, this ensures that no other dependencies must be present in the dependency they use as an injection target. We consider interfaces to be part of the Java SDK API if they reside in the `java.*` or `javax.*` packages (similar to [38]). Note that we add all interface methods even if a serializable class does not explicitly implement those due to inheritance scenarios as in Listing 7. Also, the Caller gadget contains a constructor to set all properties as well as `hashCode` as a trampoline deserialization entry point. This is specifically necessary for one of the tools we use during experimentation – *Crystallizer* [65] as its static analyzer uses a trampoline heuristic, and the fuzzer only sets properties via available constructors [31]. Finally, we repackage the Caller gadget into the original dependency JAR file.

```

1 class Caller implements Serializable {
2     public Iterator iterator; public Runnable runnable;
3     public Object object; public Function function;
4     // additional interface properties ...
5     public Caller(Iterator _iterator, Runnable _runnable, ... ) {
6         this.iterator = _iterator;
7         this.runnable = _runnable;
8         // ...
9     }
10    @Override
11    public int hashCode() {
12        iterator.next();
13        function.apply(object);
14        // additional interface method calls ...
15    }

```

Listing 6: Arbitrary JCL interface method reachability gadget.

```

1 class Base implements java.lang.Runnable {
2     @Override
3     public void run() { /*...*/ }
4 }
5 class Child extends Base implements Serializable {}

```

Listing 7: The method `Base.run()` is a gadget despite `Base` not being serializable as it is inherited to `Child.run()`.

Detectability: This modification only adds additional virtual call sites to inter-procedural analysis.

4.1.4 Other Injection Patterns. In defining injection patterns, we separate obfuscation techniques from functional modifications that activate a gadget chain. Any code modification that solely aggravates detectability such as using Java Reflection, anonymous classes, or error paths [31, 73], may be used in conjunction with injection sites, but has little value in finding dormant gadget chains.

Still, we mention two other modifications worth consideration. The `transient` keyword is a Java feature to avoid properties from being serialized. While removing the keyword is easy to automate, it does not meet the stealth criterion. Research endeavors are dedicated towards finding missing transient declarations [23, 52] and we could find no evidence of deliberate removal.

This line of research also ties in with finding gadgets in the Java Native Interface (JNI). There is merit to the idea of making the backing C/C++ code of a native Java method reachable. However, detecting JNI gadgets is a limitation of gadget chain detectors [31], thus, impacting the large-scale analysis aspect in this study.

4.2 Experimentation

4.2.1 Gadget Injection Framework. We implement the gadget injection in Java using *ASM* [5] and *SootUp* [28] (736 LoC). With this setup, we can apply modifications to bytecode-compiled dependencies. For the *transitive Serializable* pattern, we detect abstract and interface classes in a dependency with *SootUp* and then use a simple *ASM* class visitor to append the *Serializable* interface. Swapping constants (pattern 2) requires a combination of a class and method visitor to first add property fields and then, in the methods themselves, replace LDC instructions to retrieve the original constant pool value from the newly defined fields. Finally, for the *Interface Method Reachability* pattern, we implement a helper Java *SootUp* program to identify implemented interfaces of serializable classes and generate the source code of the Caller gadget. We then compile the source code and repackage it with the original dependency JAR. Table 4 provides the minimum, maximum, average amount, and standard deviation of modifications per dependency. Observe that for pattern (3), which is applicable to all datasets, for the larger datasets *B* and *A*, the average amount of interfaces added to the Caller gadget is declining. This indicates how dataset *D* (**Volatile Stealthy Gadget Providers**) is the most lucrative target for injection, regardless of the pattern.

Pattern and Dataset		<i>min</i>	<i>max</i>	\bar{x}	σ
(1) - classes modified	<i>D</i>	1	5 139	233.84	483.18
(2) - classes modified	<i>B</i>	0	11 704	308.51	832.72
	<i>D</i>	2	11 704	414.86	1 038.77
(3) - interfaces in Caller	<i>A</i>	0	42	2.47	5.73
	<i>B</i>	0	42	2.62	6.02
	<i>D</i>	0	42	3.38	6.65
all - interfaces in Caller	<i>B</i>	0	88	5.10	9.97
	<i>D</i>	0	88	7.69	11.98

Table 4: Statistics for applying patterns (1) - (3)

We also build a dependency containing all modifications. Pattern (1) leads to more classes becoming serializable, which can increase the number of interfaces added by the Caller gadget in pattern (3). Therefore, we proceed in two stages, creating an intermediary JAR with patterns (1) and (2) applied, followed by the pertaining analysis and gadget construction of (3). As seen in Table 4 (last row), this more than doubles the average number of interfaces being called from the Caller gadget.

4.2.2 Gadget Chain Detection Tools. We run the three state-of-the-art gadget chain detectors, *Tabby* [12], *Crystallizer* [65], and *AndroChain* [32], on the untouched and modified dependencies. Thereby, we aim to identify whether the tools report surplus gadget chains with the injection patterns applied. We specifically choose these three tools due to their availability, recency, and diverse methodology. We exclude the state-of-the-art tool *JDD* [10] from our study due to its fuzzer module not being available [11]. Instead, we take *Crystallizer* as the next-recent dynamic gadget chain detector. The tool employs a fuzzer to prune false positive gadget chains from the initial static analysis, which makes it the most precise of the three tools in our study. Conversely, *AndroChain* puts a strong emphasis on soundness. It is not constrained by a maximum gadget chain depth, which heavily affects *Crystallizer* [31], and partially *Tabby* [12]. *Tabby* is the currently most popular gadget chain detector (1 400 *GitHub* star rating [70]). This is likely due to the high degree of reusability from its *Deserialization-Aware Call Graph* (DA-CG) in a *Neo4j* database. In fact, two further closed-source research projects leveraged *Tabby* to improve gadget chain detection [8, 9].

AndroChain is provided as a standalone executable JAR file. Thus, the analysis workload can be efficiently distributed with *GNU Parallel* [66] onto the 128 CPUs of the experimentation server⁶. Since both *Crystallizer* and *Tabby*'s *Neo4j* database are docker-contained, we can parallelize by launching multiple containers and orchestrating the dependency analysis tasks to those. Moreover, *Crystallizer* is recommended to run 25 hours on each dependency – one hour for dynamic sink identification and 24 hours for fuzzing gadget chains. We can speed up the analysis by first running *Crystallizer* only for one hour in dynamic sink analysis and static gadget chain detection. If this part yields no results⁷, there is no reason to run the full 24-hour fuzzing campaign. For *Tabby*, we configure the toolchain described by the maintainers: *tabby* [70] for generating the DA-CG, *tabby-path-finder* [68] as the custom *Neo4j* procedure plugin, and *tabby-vul-finder* [69] to load the DA-CG and execute queries. Once a cluster of *Neo4j* containers is launched with the *path-finder* plugin, we again leverage *GNU Parallel* for DA-CG generation, database import, and querying.

The tool instrumentation, container orchestration, and result parsing is implemented in 590 lines of *Python* code.

4.2.3 Automation Aspects. The automated pattern injection clearly overestimates the number of valid injection sites that lead to activating a dormant gadget chain. For one, this is because the injection is chain agnostic. The pattern is applied to any code location regardless of whether it could be used as a gadget. Further, by leveraging gadget chain detectors, we find new gadget chains related to the modification (diff comparison in Figure 4). Gadget chain detectors are known to come with limitations regarding their soundness and precision. In particular, there is limited availability of robust fuzzers [31] that do not over-prune statically detected gadget chains. Therefore, we also rely on two purely static gadget chain detectors, which necessitate manual verification to determine the successful injection sites. Future improvements to gadget chain detection precision will enable our framework to be fully automated.

⁶ *Debian Linux* 5.10.218 OS with a 64-core AMD EPYC 7713P (2.00GHz) processor and 995GB RAM

⁷ I.e., the intermediary results/concretization/gadgetDB.store file is missing.

	Tabby [12]				Crystallizer [65]				AndroChain [32]			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	all	(1)	(2)	(3)	all	(1)	(2)	(3)	all
A (533)	-	-	45 (8.4%)	56 (10.5%)	-	-	0 (0.0%)	8 (1.5%)	-	-	48 (9.0%)	101 (18.9%)
B (352)	-	42 (11.9%)	33 (9.4%)	44 (12.5%)	-	7 (2.0%)	0 (0.0%)	8 (2.3%)	-	9 (2.6%)	29 (11.1%)	82 (23.3%)
D (208)	33 (15.9%)	32 (15.4%)	27 (13.0%)	35 (16.8%)	8 (3.8%)	4 (1.9%)	0 (0.0%)	6 (2.9%)	66 (31.7%)	7 (3.4%)	23 (11.1%)	74 (35.6%)

Table 5: Dependencies with additional gadget chain detections in the datasets A (Gadget Providers), B (Active Gadget Providers), and D (Volatile Stealthy Gadget Providers), when applying the changes (1) - (3) in isolation, or all applicable changes combined.

4.3 Results

Table 5 shows the results of running *Tabby*, *Crystallizer*, and *AndroChain* on the three datasets and with the individual modifications applied. It represents how many of the modified dependencies contained additional gadget chains in comparison to the unmodified dependency, according to the respective gadget chain detectors. These additional detections are a soft proof for dormant gadget chains. Even though it does not indicate whether these are true positives, it shows that further execution paths were considered by the tools during analysis. Overall, the tools found potential dormant gadget chains in 139 (26.08%) dependencies for dataset A, 114 (32.39%) for dataset B, and 99 for dataset D (47.60%).

Crystallizer's results are underwhelming for a few reasons. Recall that *Crystallizer* starts with a dynamic identification of potential sink methods. This preliminary fuzzing stage shrunk the number of eligible dependencies to 92 (17.3%) in dataset A, 67 (19.0%) in B, and 49 in D (23.6%). Further, *Crystallizer* detects chains only up to a length of five gadgets [31, 64]. The gadget chain fuzzer uses constructors and setter methods to set properties⁸. While we specifically accommodated for this constraint in our modification patterns (see Section 4.1.3), *Crystallizer* still fails to set all possible properties (i.e., using Java Reflection) in the gadgets contained by the dependency as is. Also note that due to the non-determinism of fuzzing, *Crystallizer* reported alleged additional gadget chains in two more dependencies when applying only modification (1) as opposed to applying all modifications (Table 5, row D). For all the above-mentioned reasons, we do not consider *Crystallizer*'s results representative for the success rate of our injection patterns. We further prove this by manual verification of *Tabby*'s and *AndroChain*'s gadget chains in Sections 4.4 and 4.5.

Considering *Tabby*'s and *AndroChain*'s results, all three modification patterns appear to be a viable strategy to activate dormant gadget chains. *AndroChain* may have a small delta to the detections in the unmodified dependencies for pattern (2) due to it not filtering outputs based on taint⁹.

Here, it proves crucial to have the comparison to a different state-of-the-art tool, i.e., *Tabby*. For *Tabby*, all patterns have approximately similar viability. One should not be deceived by the declining relative amount of dormant gadget chain detections in the larger datasets A and B with all modifications applied. This is likely due to not applying patterns (1) and (2). However, when regarding pattern (3) in isolation, there is an indication of diminishing returns for the larger datasets.

⁸[64] - `/src/dynamic/Meta.java`, line 850ff. and line 1088ff.

⁹The tool still outputs the propagated taint value in its results, which we could use to calculate a delta [32].

4.4 Verifying Gadget Chain Detections

Table 5 provides a soft proof of the individual patterns' success rates. This is backed by 830 new gadget chain detections by *Tabby*, 868 by *Crystallizer*, and 2785 by *AndroChain*. In this section, we provide hard evidence for our gadget injection framework by manually determining true positives from the tools' results.

We start by filtering out gadget chains, leading to less promising sink methods. For instance, *Tabby* and *AndroChain* consider `Class.forName()` and `Class.getMethod()` to be sinks. That is likely because they may be succeeded by a call to `Method.invoke()` - a typical usage pattern of Java Reflection [31, 36]. Yet, in isolation, these methods have no strong security implication [18]. We also disregard sink methods related to *InputStreams*. Verifying gadget chains with these sinks is more time-consuming since it requires not only verifying the gadget chains' control flow but also the subsequent usage of the *InputStream* in the program. Overall, we restrict ourselves to 23 interesting sink methods (complete listing, see Appendix B).

This leaves us with 1990 gadget chains in 126 dependencies after filtering. We distribute the workload of verifying these gadget chains on three researchers in our team. Each researcher receives a set of 42 dependencies with the respective tools' gadget chain detections. Upon confirming one true positive, we skip the remaining detected gadget chains for this dependency. This is because we are interested in a measure of how many dependencies are susceptible to our injection patterns. The manual analysis involves decompilers (*JADX* [62]) and debugging tools (*IntelliJ* [27]) for PoC generation. The latter is reserved for complex cases (e.g., Appendix B, Table 15) where we cannot be certain from static analysis whether the conditions for a certain control flow can be met. We cannot do this in every case since creating a PoC for a single gadget chain takes around two hours. Overall, our analysis spans over a work week.

Our combined efforts yield verified gadget chains in 53 dependencies. We list the gadget chains in Appendix C. Figure 5 shows how many of these verified dormant gadget chains could be activated by applying the change patterns individually or in combination. Indeed, each pattern is viable on its own for at least one dependency. More specifically, 26 (49.06%) of the dormant gadget chains require only one of the three change patterns. It shows that for half of the true positive cases, dependencies are on the verge of containing a security-critical gadget chain. The most common missing prerequisite is *interface method reachability*, which, as we discussed in Section 4.1, is the easiest to satisfy from an attacker's perspective.

Table 6 zooms in on the dormant gadget chains, which can be activated through *interface method reachability*. Many of the listed method calls (e.g., `AutoCloseable.close()` or `Iterator.next()`) have a benign appearance. This drastically increases the odds of




Figure 5: Venn diagram of how many dependencies were activated with which modification(s).

such a call edge being introduced. Moreover, in the cases where no further changes are required (✓ in Table 6), one can actually assume the interface methods as sink methods for a gadget chain detector. Upon finding a chain to these interface sinks, the full gadget chain can be constructed by combining it with an applicable dormant gadget chain for *interface method reachability* (see Appendix C.3).

Interface Method	Count	Single
java.lang.Runnable.run()	10	✓
java.util.concurrent.Callable.call()	1	✓
java.awt.event.ActionListener.actionPerformed()	2	✓
java.beans.PropertyChangeListener.propertyChange()	3	✓
java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler.invoke()	6	✓
javax.sql.DataSource.getConnection()	3	✓
javax.sql.XADataSource.getXAConnection()	1	✓
java.lang.AutoCloseable.close()	6	✓
javax.sql.RowSet.rollback()	3	✓
javax.xml.transform.Transformer.newTransformer()	1	✓
java.sql.Connection.isValid()	1	
java.util.Iterator.hasNext()	4	
java.util.Iterator.next()	2	
java.lang.Iterable.iterator()	1	
java.util.Map.put()	1	
java.io.Flushable.flush()	1	

Table 6: Java interface methods activating dormant gadget chains. A tick (✓) in the *single* column signifies that the activation requires no additional change patterns.

4.5 Case Studies

In this section, we provide two concrete examples of how the injection patterns can activate dormant gadget chains and analyze a case where it fails.

4.5.1 *Apache OpenJPA*. [67] is an alternate Java Persistence API used by 327 downstream projects on the *Maven Repository*. This dormant gadget chain (see Table 7) incorporates all three modification patterns. While this makes the chain harder to activate, it highlights the relevance of all three patterns in a single coherent example. We show examples requiring only one modification in the following case study or in Section 2.2, Listing 3.

```

java.util.Iterator.hasNext()
↔ org.apache.openjpa.jdbc.meta.strats.LRSProxyMap$ResultIterator.hasNext()
↔ org.apache.openjpa.jdbc.sql.MergedResult.next()
↔ org.apache.openjpa.jdbc.sql.LogicalUnion$ResultComparator.getOrderingValue(Result, int)
↔ org.apache.openjpa.jdbc.sql.LogicalUnion$ResultComparator.getOrderingValue(Result, Object)
↔ org.apache.openjpa.jdbc.sql.PostgresDictionary.getObject()
↔ java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke()
    
```

Table 7: Apache OpenJPA [67] dormant gadget chain.

Listing 8 shows the entry point in `ResultIterator.hasNext()`. This is a perfect target for a hidden `Caller` gadget calling `hasNext()` on a generic Java iterator. The gadget chain continues by invoking `Result.next()` at line 9.

```

1 package org.apache.openjpa.jdbc.meta.strats;
2 class LRSProxyMap {
3     private class ResultIterator implements Iterator, Closeable {
4         private final Result[] _res;
5         private Boolean _next = null;
6         @Override
7         public boolean hasNext() {
8             if (_next == null)
9                 _next = (_res[0].next()) ? Boolean.TRUE : Boolean.FALSE;
10            return _next;
11        }
12    }
    
```

Listing 8: `LRSProxyMap$ResultIterator.hasNext()`.

Then, using a `MergedResult`, one can divert the execution flow to a `ResultComparator` (Listing 9, line 16). Take note of how an attacker has control of the properties `_status` and `_pushedBack` to satisfy the conditional statements at lines 10 and 13.

```

1 package org.apache.openjpa.jdbc.sql;
2 public class MergedResult implements Result {
3     private final Result[] _res;
4     private final byte[] _status;
5     private final ResultComparator _comp;
6     private boolean _pushedBack = false;
7
8     @Override
9     public boolean next() throws SQLException {
10        if (_pushedBack) { ... }
11        if (_comp == null) { ... }
12        for (int i = 0; i < _status.length; i++) {
13            switch (_status[i]) {
14                case NEXT:
15                    if (_res[i].next())
16                        _order[i] = _comp.getOrderingValue(_res[i], i);
17                    break;
18            }
19        }
20    }
21    public interface ResultComparator extends Comparator {
22        Object getOrderingValue(Result res, int idx);
23    }
24 }
    
```

Listing 9: `MergedResult.next()`

In Listing 10, the gadget chain proceeds with the `ResultComparator` implementation in the `LogicalUnion` class. At line 10, it shows that the `Result` passed to the comparator in `MergedResult` needs to be of type `ResultSetResult`. So, even if it is not visible in the gadget chain (Table 7), we must ensure this class is also serializable so it can be used during payload construction. The `ResultSet` retrieved at line 10 is further passed to a call to `DBDictionary.getObject()` via lines 12 and 16.

```

1 package org.apache.openjpa.jdbc.sql;
2 private static class LogicalUnion.ResultComparator
3 implements MergedResult.ResultComparator {
4
5     private final List[] _orders;
6     private final DBDictionary _dict;
7
8     @Override
9     public Object getOrderingValue(Result res, int idx) {
10        ResultSet rs = ((ResultSetResult) res).getResultSet();
11        if (_orders[idx].size() == 1)
12            return getOrderingValue(rs, _orders[idx].get(0));
13        ...
14    }
15    private Object getOrderingValue(ResultSet rs, Object i) {
16        return _dict.getObject(rs, (Integer) i + 1, null);
17    }
18 }

```

Listing 10: LogicalUnion\$ResultComparator

Finally, we use a `PostgresDictionary`'s implementation of `getObject()` to achieve arbitrary method execution. In Listing 11, the string constants at lines 7 and 10 present themselves to be extracted as final attributes according to the second modification pattern. This bypasses both the class name constraint to the object retrieved from the `ResultSet` (line 5) and the method name constraint. As popularized by *Yoserial* gadget chains, we can supply a `TemplatesImpl` instance to achieve arbitrary code execution from the arbitrary method invocation [18].

```

1 package org.apache.openjpa.jdbc.sql;
2 public class PostgresDitionary extends DBDictionary {
3     @Override
4     public Object getObject(ResultSet rs, int column, Map map) {
5         Object obj = super.getObject(rs, column, map);
6         if (obj.getClass().getName()
7             .equals("org.postgresql.util.PGobject")) {
8             try {
9                 Method m = obj.getClass()
10                    .getMethod("getType", (Class[]) null);
11                 Object type = m.invoke(obj, (Object[]) null);
12                 } catch (Throwable t) { ... }
13             }
14             return obj;
15         }
16     }

```

Listing 11: PostgresDitionary

We visualize the payload construction for the dormant *OpenJPA* gadget chain in Appendix D. Overall, three interfaces were made serializable, two string literals were extracted as final properties in `PostgresDitionary`, and a trampoline call edge to `Iterator.hasNext()` was introduced. The changes are not far-fetched considering that the number of serializable classes in *Apache OpenJPA* has been steadily increasing from 310 in its first release to 637 in the current version.

4.5.2 Handlebars. The dormant gadget chain in *Handlebars* [16] (see Appendix C, Table 10) revolves around a single modification of class serializability. By making the interface `TemplateSource` or the class `AbstractTemplateSource` serializable, the two subtypes in Listings 12 and 13 indirectly become gadgets. Knowing that `Object.equals()` is a trampoline gadget [18, 32, 56], an attacker can trigger `TemplateSource.lastModified()` via a `ReloadableTemplateSource` (see Listing 12).

```

1 package com.github.jknack.handlebars.io;
2 class ReloadableTemplateSource extends ForwardingTemplateSource{
3     public boolean equals(Object obj) {
4         if (this == obj) return true;
5         if (obj instanceof TemplateSource) {
6             TemplateSource that = (TemplateSource) obj;
7             return filename().equals(that.filename()) &&
8                lastModified() == that.lastModified();
9         }
10        return false;
11    }}

```

Listing 12: ReloadableTemplateSource

From here, the inherited call to `lastModified()` in `URLTemplateSource` (see Listing 13, line 5) reaches the sink method `URLConnection.openConnection()`. This allows attackers to execute SSRF or an NTLM-reflection attack [76].

```

1 package com.github.jknack.handlebars.io;
2 class URLTemplateSource extends AbstractTemplateSource {
3     private URL resource;
4     private Long lastModified;
5     public long lastModified() {
6         synchronized (this) {
7             if (this.lastModified == null)
8                 this.lastModified = Long.valueOf(
9                     lastModified(this.resource));
10        } ...
11    }
12     private long lastModified(URL resource) {
13         URLConnection uc = resource.openConnection();
14         ...
15    }}

```

Listing 13: URLTemplateSource

4.5.3 False positive case. Failing cases for the injection patterns are coupled to the gadget chain detector's capacity for recognizing false positives. A good example of this is the seemingly taintable call to `Method.invoke()` in *FastJson*'s [1] `GetterFunction` class (see Listing 14). However, the `Method` class is not serializable, and since it is part of the Java Class Library, an attacker cannot render the class itself serializable from within the dependency.

```

1 package com.alibaba.fastjson2.support;
2 class GetterFunction implements Function {
3     final Method method;
4     @Override // java.util.function.Function
5     public Object apply(Object arg) {
6         try {
7             return this.method.invoke(arg, new Object[0]);
8         } catch (Exception e) { ... }
9     }}

```

Listing 14: GetterFunction

5 Discussion

5.1 Threats to Validity

5.1.1 Injection Patterns. In this work, we evaluated three specific patterns to enable gadget chains in real-world dependencies. These patterns were chosen due to their trivial injection conditions. This enabled us to apply the changes automatically on a large scale. However, we do not claim that these are the only changes that

enable dormant gadget chains. Indeed, an attacker could add new classes or methods [60] which blend into the functionality of the dependency's code. Such modifications would, however, require domain-specific knowledge and are, thus, challenging to automate.

Assessing the stealthiness of our three injection patterns is hard. One could argue against the local code modification in pattern (2) - *final properties* being stealthy, even though common criticism of the opaqueness in Java serialization suggests otherwise [21, 22]. Regardless, the other two patterns proved sufficient in the majority (73.58%, see Figure 5) of cases to activate dormant gadget chains. Especially, the *interface method reachability* pattern can empirically be assumed stealthy since the modification can be hidden in another unrelated dependency.

5.1.2 Dependency Dataset Size. We analyzed popular dependencies from the *Maven* repository. This led us to define four comprehensive datasets (see Section 3.3) that we propose as a new baseline for gadget chain detection research. They encompass dependencies that, by containing serializable classes, have the potential to be leveraged towards a deserialization gadget chain. Of course, our analysis can be extended to all available dependencies and, furthermore, open-source software projects. Given that the baseline has been the 41 dependencies in *Ysoserial*, we believe it is a reasonable step to first focus on a comprehensive view of high-profile targets in the supply chain. This is exactly what we aimed for by filtering out the most popular dependencies from *Maven*.

5.1.3 Gadget Chain Detection. Our choice of gadget chain detectors is motivated by the *Gleipner* publication [31], which tested all, at that time, available gadget chain detection tools on a synthetic benchmark. According to their work, *Crystallizer* [65] is the most precise and *Tabby* [12] the most sound tool available. We excluded *JDD* [10] from our study since their injection object construction (IOCD) fuzzer is not available on their repository. However, we included the recent gadget chain detector, *AndroChain* [32], which detects more gadget chains than *Tabby* on *Ysoserial* as a benchmark. In doing so, we cover a reasonable proportion of the state-of-the-art in gadget chain detection. The omission of other gadget chain detectors in this work should not deter us. If anything, it would have led to even more detections of dormant gadget chains.

The meager results from *Crystallizer* can be explained by comparing *Crystallizer's* limitations [31, 65] with the verified dormant gadget chains in Appendix C. Of the 53 chains, 31 (58.49%) are too long regarding *Crystallizer's* maximum search length of five. A further 14 gadget chains lead to sink gadgets that do not match the criteria for *Crystallizer's* dynamic sink identification [65]. Specifically, sink gadgets are only considered exploitable if they contain a call to `Method.invoke()` or `FileOutputStream.write()`¹⁰. Then, 7 of the remaining 8 gadget chains rely on calling `InvocationHandler.invoke()` via the *interface method reachability* pattern. Recall that we use a gadget containing the method parameters as properties (Listing 6), i.e., the gadget contains a property of type `Method` to emulate the link to an arbitrary `InvocationHandler`. As highlighted in the case study,

Method is not serializable, which is why *Crystallizer's* fuzzer correctly assesses that there is no gadget chain. However, this does not invalidate the pattern for these cases. An attacker would implement a custom `readObject()` method in the caller gadget to reconstruct the Method property during deserialization. The remaining gadget chain in Appendix C, Table 46 was not detected by *Crystallizer* due to a limitation in its fuzzer input object construction. The tool sets object properties only via constructors or using setter methods¹¹.

5.1.4 Single Dependency Analysis. The results of applying the three modification patterns to single dependencies prove that it is possible to activate dormant gadget chains with these changes. This was the main objective of our study. However, the attack surface could be drastically increased by incorporating cross-dependency analysis. Indeed, in *Ysoserial* 15/34 (44.12%), gadget chain payloads rely on more than one dependency [18]. For cross-dependency analysis, one could extract commonly grouped dependency clusters from open-source software build files and then search for gadget chains in these clusters. Moreover, regarding the *interface method reachability* pattern, instead of only considering interfaces in the JCL, one could also include interfaces of upstream dependencies.

5.2 Implications and Mitigation

Our work confirms that, despite its flaws and security risks, the *Serializable API* remains a widely used part of Java-based software. The analysis in Section 3 proves that *Serializable* usage is, if anything, increasing. This appears to be a predicament for the Java platform. *JVM* providers (e.g., *Oracle*, *OpenJDK*, and *IBM*) cannot supersede the current implementation of the *Serializable API* when its usage is widespread, whereas users continue to rely on it because it is the de facto serialization standard provided by *JDK* vendors.

Our three gadget injection patterns successfully reactivated dormant gadget chains in a range of popular dependencies. This includes well-established artifacts like the Spring framework, Apache Hadoop, and Flink. Given that these dependencies have a strong potential to compromise many downstream dependents, the overall success rate of applying the gadget injection (9.94%) is substantial. About half (26) of the dormant gadget chains we verified required only one of our three modification patterns to be activated. These chains are on the verge of becoming a real vulnerability.

This gives the opportunity to preemptively mitigate these weaknesses before they can be leveraged by an attacker. Once revealed, it is quite straightforward to remove gadgets from the dependencies' side or the dependents. Even classes that currently do not implement the *Serializable* interface can define `readObject()` (see Listing 15) to prevent a class from ever being deserialized [50]. By making this requirement explicit, it is nearly impossible for an attacker to covertly apply the *transitive serializable* pattern.

```

1 class URLTemplateSource extends AbstractTemplateSource {
2   + private final void readObject(ObjectInputStream in)
3   +   throws IOException {
4   +     throw new IOException("Cannot be deserialized");
5   }}

```

Listing 15: Preventing deserialization in potential gadgets.

¹⁰<https://github.com/HexHive/Crystallizer/blob/main/src/static/src/main/java/analysis/SinkAnalysis.java#L361>

¹¹<https://github.com/HexHive/Crystallizer/blob/main/src/dynamic/Meta.java#L850>

However, if a class needs to remain serializable, then the logic should prevent a security-sensitive sink gadget from being reached. Specifically, we emphasize the implications of the *interface method reachability* pattern. In our view, it is almost trivial for an attacker to hide a gadget calling a new trampoline method (e.g., `Iterator.hasNext()`) in another dependency. While maintainers have no control over such changes, they can declare critical taintable properties as transient [23] or constrain the set of permissible values by making the hidden deserialization constructor explicit. For instance, *Spring's DisposableBeanAdapter* uses verification logic in its constructor, which is omitted through deserialization. Although it technically allows setting arbitrary destroy method names, for the purpose of deserialization, it is advisable to restrict the methods to the already declared constants (Listing 16, line 2).

```

1 class DisposableBeanAdapter implements Runnable, Serializable {
2     private static final String DESTROY_METHOD_NAME = "destroy";
3     private String[] destroyMethodNames;
4     + void readObject(ObjectInputStream in) throws Exception {
5     +     in.defaultReadObject();
6     +     for (String methodName : destroyMethodNames) {
7     +         if (!methodName.equals(DESTROY_METHOD_NAME) || ...)
8     +             throw new Exception("Illegal destroy method name.");
9     +     }
10  }

```

Listing 16: Safe deserialization DisposableBeanAdapter [63].

On the dependents' side, mitigation involves restricting the set of permissible classes in deserialization. Research on automated tools to deduce this set is ongoing [14, 61]. Therefore, the practical solution that is unlikely to impact an application's functionality is to define a deserialization filter [57, 58]. We provide a general deserialization filter list, which can be combined with existing filter lists in Appendix E. However, we further advise users to identify dormant gadget chains specific to their own application by utilizing our framework. With it, they can identify potentially dangerous gadgets and craft a custom, more stringent filter list. Possibly, the manual verification of dormant gadget chains is not even necessary for filter list construction. A fully automated filter list generation would then (1) use our automated injection framework and run gadget chain detectors over the modified application bytecode, and (2) determine the critical taintable gadgets and add those to a filter regardless of whether the detected chain is a true positive. Since this clearly overestimates the filter, future work would have to assess the impact of such an approach on application functionality.

6 Related Work

6.1 Java Deserialization Gadget Chains

There is a vast body of research dedicated towards detecting gadget chains [3, 6, 9, 12, 24, 32, 35, 37, 39, 40, 59, 72]. As shown with the *Gleipner* benchmark [31], the tools' distinct analysis approaches come with strong tradeoffs regarding their soundness or precision. This is why we chose to incorporate three recent gadget chain detectors to verify the success rate of our injection patterns. In this way, our contribution is distinct from previous work. We do not propose a new gadget chain detector but rather employ these tools in a unified framework to identify dormant gadget chains.

The potential of introducing Java deserialization gadget chains over a dependency's evolution was analyzed on the dependencies in

Ysoserial [18, 30, 60]. As such, *Sayar et al.* [60] determined the main causes of how patches enable a gadget chain. The main limitation of these studies, as well as the gadget chain detection tools, is that they targeted small dependency datasets related to *Ysoserial* rather than performing a large-scale analysis of commonly used dependencies. The large-scale analysis of gadget chains in the *Android Open Source Project* [32] stands as an exception. While the authors did not find any exploitable gadget chains, they observed two examples of dormant gadget chains in the *RxJava* dependency. On this basis, they propose investigating the viability of deserialization gadget chains as a supply chain attack.

6.2 Supply Chain Attacks

There is ample evidence for the increasing risk of software supply chain attacks [17, 41, 51]. The *Backstabber's Knife Collection* [44] entails an analysis of 174 malicious packages on package repositories. Together with the work of *Ladisa et al.* [33] it has created a solid understanding of attack types and targets in a software supply chain. Specifically, our injection patterns for Java deserialization gadget chains fall into the categories *AV-100 Develop and Advertise distinct Malicious Package from Scratch* and *AV-304 Make immature Vulnerability Exploitable* [33].

Wu et al. pointed out the high false alarm rate in supply chain dependents. They showed that upstream dependencies in the *Maven* ecosystem affect only 10.4% of downstream projects through usage of a vulnerable upstream function [74]. However, this rate is not representative for our study since the insecure entry point `ObjectInputStream.readObject()` is assumed to be present in the downstream project while the choice of gadgets from the upstream project is unconstrained. The downstream project incorporates the gadgets in its classpath and is, thus, not required to explicitly use any vulnerable function. This means that if the gadget chain exists in a dependency, then it also exists within the user.

6.3 Vulnerability Injection

Hypocrite Commits [73] aims to stealthily add UAF vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel with concurrency and error-handling paths. In contrast, our work leverages Java's polymorphism and serialization semantics to activate gadget chains through seemingly benign code. This expands the state of the art by targeting a different ecosystem (Java dependencies vs. Linux kernel C code), a different class of vulnerabilities (deserialization gadget chains vs. memory safety bugs), and a distinct strategy for stealth (polymorphism and opaqueness in Java serialization rather than control-flow ambiguity).

Ladisa et al. injected malicious bytecode into benign JAR files to evaluate different malicious package detection strategies [34]. Instead of using immature vulnerabilities, the authors inserted three standalone payloads. Doing so requires a higher degree of compromise to avoid code review (e.g., achieving maintainer status) than contributing stealthy code changes.

Finally, our automated framework is adjacent to bug injection research [7, 15, 26, 53, 54, 77]. However, bug injection is mostly performed for the purpose of fuzzer evaluation and their modifications are, thus, overt. For instance, the removal of conditional guards by *FixReverter* [77] is unlikely to go unnoticed in code review.

7 Conclusion

In this work, we investigated the usage of the Java *Serializable* API in a large dataset of 1 100 popular *Maven* dependencies over their evolution. It showed that in dependencies that use *Serializable*, the number of serializable classes has a weak positive correlation with time. This means, if anything, *Serializable* usage is increasing. From here, we defined four dependency datasets, which we propose as a baseline for future gadget chain detection research. Then, for the dependencies in these datasets, we injected three bug patterns to activate dormant gadget chains. We ran three gadget chain detection tools on both the modified and untouched dependencies and compared the results. For 139 dependencies, the tools detected additional gadget chains. This provides a soft proof of the patterns' viability to activate dormant gadget chains. Furthermore, we manually confirmed dormant gadget chains in 53 dependencies. It corresponds to a success rate of 9.94% for our injection patterns.

Overall, our work showed that Java deserialization gadget chains are a much broader liability to software than detecting full gadget chains could possibly capture. It makes awareness of dormant gadget chains paramount to strengthen the software supply chain.

8 Data Availability

We share our experimentation data and toolchain with the following URL: <https://github.com/software-engineering-and-security/SleepingGiants>. We do not disclose the gadget chains detected by the tools in the unmodified dependencies. It was not within this work's scope to verify these gadget chain detections, and, thus, by publishing the results, we would risk unintentionally disclosing real vulnerabilities.

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A Maven Repository Download URL Construction

```
https://<repository>/<package>/<dependency>/<version>
/<dependency>-<version>.<jar|aar>
# Example:
https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/org/slf4j/slf4j-api/1.1.0
/slf4j-api-1.1.0.jar
```

Listing 17: General structure of Maven repository download URLs.

```
https://repo1.maven.org/maven2
https://repo.clojars.org
https://repo.akka.io/maven
https://maven.google.com
https://maven.artifacts.atlassian.com
https://maven.wso2.org/nexus/content/repositories/releases
https://nexus.bedatadriven.com/content/groups/public
https://repository.mulesoft.org/nexus/content/repositories/public
https://repo.jenkins-ci.org/releases
https://nexus.senbox.net/nexus/content/repositories/releases
https://open.artefacts.tax.service.gov.uk/maven2
```

Table 8: Maven repository base URLs.

B Sink Method Filtering for Gadget Chain Verification

Sink Method	Count
java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke	608
java.lang.ClassLoader.defineClass	32
org.springframework.jndi.JndiTemplate.lookup	3
java.sql.PreparedStatement.execute	1
java.io.FileOutputStream.write	168
java.lang.ClassLoader.loadClass	77
java.net.URL.openConnection	142
java.sql.Statement.execute	1
javax.naming.InitialContext.lookup	1
java.lang.reflect.Constructor.newInstance	423
java.io.FileOutputStream.<init>	91
java.sql.PreparedStatement.executeQuery	3
java.io.File.delete	91
java.beans.Introspector.getBeanInfo	3
java.net.URL.openStream	119
java.sql.DriverManager.getConnection	1
java.sql.Connection.prepareStatement	4
java.nio.file.Files.newOutputStream	28
javax.naming.Context.lookup	900
java.lang.ProcessBuilder.<init>	11
java.lang.Runtime.exec	18
java.rmi.registry.Registry.lookup	1
java.nio.file.Files.newBufferedWriter	7
<i>Filtered</i>	
java.io.FileInputStream.<init>	202
java.lang.Class.forName	239
java.lang.Class.getMethod	260
java.lang.Class.getDeclaredMethod	48
java.lang.ClassLoader.getResourceAsStream	12
java.lang.Class.getResourceAsStream	5
java.nio.file.Files.readAllLines	7
java.io.FileReader.<init>	1
org.xml.sax.XMLReader.parse	4
java.io.RandomAccessFile.read	4
java.io.RandomAccessFile.readFully	2
java.nio.file.Files.newInputStream	81
java.nio.file.Files.newBufferedReader	5
java.nio.file.Files.readAllBytes	9
java.util.zip.ZipInputStream.<init>	1
com.esotericsoftware.kryo.Kryo.readClassAndObject	2

Table 9: Sink methods in dormant gadget chains. The sink methods in the lower section are filtered out for the manual verification. Note that we also disregard the dynamically identified sinks by *Crystallizer*. The definition of considering any method which operates on arbitrary objects produces a high amount of false positive sink methods [65].

C Verified Dormant Gadget Chains

C.1 Transitive Serializability

```
java.util.Hashtable.readObject()
↳ java.util.Hashtable.readHashtable()
↳ java.util.Hashtable.reconstitutionPut()
↳ com.github.jknack.handlebars.io.ReloadableTemplateSource.equals()
↳ com.github.jknack.handlebars.io.URLTemplateSource.lastModified()
↳ com.github.jknack.handlebars.io.URLTemplateSource(URL)
↳ java.net.URL.openConnection()
```

Table 10: *com.github.jknack.handlebars-4.4.0*

C.2 Final Attributes

```
org.apache.flink.api.common.state.StateDescriptor.readObject()
↳ org.apache.flink.api.java.typeutils.runtime.kryo.KryoSerializer.deserialize()
↳ org.apache.flink.api.java.typeutils.runtime.kryo.KryoSerializer.checkKryoInitialized()
↳ org.apache.flink.api.java.typeutils.runtime.kryo.KryoSerializer.getKryoInstance()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke()
```

Table 11: *org.apache.flink.flink-core-1.19.2*

```
org.jfree.chart.plot.CombinedRangeCategoryPlot.readObject()
↳ org.jfree.chart.axis.PeriodAxis.configure()
↳ org.jfree.chart.axis.PeriodAxis.autoAdjustRange()
↳ org.jfree.chart.axis.PeriodAxis.createInstance()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Constructor.newInstance()
```

Table 12: *org.jfree.jfreechart-1.5.5*

```
org.rogach.scallop.SerializationProxy.readObject()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Constructor.newInstance()
```

Table 13: *org.rogach.scallop-5.2.0*

C.3 Interface Method Reachability

```
java.lang.Runnable.run()
↳ org.springframework.beans.factory.support.DisposableBeanAdapter.run()
↳ org.springframework.beans.factory.support.DisposableBeanAdapter.destroy()
↳ org.springframework.beans.factory.support.DisposableBeanAdapter.invokeCustomDestroyMethod()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke()
```

Table 14: *org.springframework.spring-beans-6.1.17*

```
java.beans.PropertyChangeListener.propertyChange()
↳ org.htmlparser.beans.HTMLTextBean.propertyChange()
↳ javax.swing.text.JTextComponent.setText()
↳ javax.swing.text.AbstractDocument.replace()
↳ javax.swing.text.DefaultFormatterDefaultDocumentFilter.replace()
↳ javax.swing.text.NumberFormatter.replace()
↳ javax.swing.text.NumberFormatter.toggleSignIfNecessary()
↳ javax.swing.text.NumberFormatter.toggleSign()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Constructor.newInstance()
```

Table 15: *org.htmlparser.htmlparser-2.1*

```
javax.sql.DataSource.getConnection()
↳ org.apache.commons.dbcp2.datasources.InstanceKeyDataSource.getConnection()
↳ org.apache.commons.dbcp2.datasources.InstanceKeyDataSource.testCPDS()
↳ javax.naming.InitialContext.lookup()
↳ javax.naming.Context.lookup()
```

Table 16: *org.apache.commons.commons-dbcp2-2.13.0*

```
java.lang.AutoCloseable.close()
↳ org.mapdb.BTreeMap.close()
↳ org.mapdb.StoreTrivialTx.close()
↳ java.io.File.delete()
```

Table 17: *org.mapdb.mapdb-3.1.0*

```
java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler.invoke()
↳ org.apache.openejb.threads.impl.ContextServiceImpl$CUHandler.invoke()
↳ org.apache.openejb.threads.impl.ContextServiceImpl$CUHandler.lambda$invoke$0()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke()
```

Table 18: *org.apache.tomee.openejb-core-10.0.0*

```
java.lang.Runnable.run()
↳ com.googlecode.aviator.runtime.function.AbstractVariadicFunction.run()
↳ com.googlecode.aviator.runtime.function.AbstractVariadicFunction.call()
↳ com.googlecode.aviator.runtime.function.ClassMethodFunction.variadicCall()
↳ com.googlecode.aviator.util.Reflector.invokeStaticMethod()
↳ com.googlecode.aviator.util.Reflector.invokeMatchingMethod()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke()
```

Table 19: *com.googlecode.aviator.aviator-5.4.2*

```
javax.sql.RowSet.rollback()
↳ oracle.jdbc.rowset.OracleCachedRowSet.rollback()
↳ oracle.jdbc.rowset.OracleCachedRowSet.getConnectionInternal()
↳ javax.naming.InitialContext.lookup()
↳ javax.naming.Context.lookup()
```

Table 20: *com.oracle.database.jdbc.ojdbcx-21.17.0.0* - this gadget chain is the same for ojdbc 11, 8 and 6

```
java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler.invoke()
↳ org.hibernate.validator.internal.util.annotation.AnnotationProxy.invoke()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke()
```

Table 21: *org.hibernate.validator.hibernate-validator-8.0.2*

```
java.util.concurrent.Callable.call()
↳ org.redisson.mapreduce.CoordinatorTask.call()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Constructor.newInstance()
```

Table 22: *org.redisson.redisson-3.44.0*

```
java.lang.Runnable.run()
↳ weka.gui.experiment.RunPanel$ExperimentRunner.run()
↳ weka.experiment.Experiment.initialize()
↳ weka.experiment.RandomSplitResultProducer.preProcess()
↳ weka.experiment.CSVResultListener.preProcess()
↳ java.io.FileOutputStream.<init>()
```

Table 23: *nz.ac.waikato.cms.weka.weka-dev-3.9.6*

```
java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler.invoke()
↳ org.apache.bval.jsr.util.AnnotationProxy.invoke()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke()
```

Table 24: *org.apache.bval.bval-jsr-3.0.1*

```
java.awt.event.ActionListener.actionPerformed()
↳ org.jdesktop.swing.action.ServerAction.actionPerformed()
↳ java.net.URL.openConnection()
```

Table 25: *org.swinglabs.swingx-1.6.1*

```
java.lang.reflect.InocationHandler.invoke()
↳ org.apache.ibatis.logging.jdbc.ResultSetLogger.invoke()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke()
```

Table 26: *org.mybatis.mybatis-3.5.19*

```
javax.sql.XADataSource.getXAConnection()
↳ com.alibaba.druid.pool.xa.getXAConnection()
↳ com.alibaba.druid.pool.DruidDataSource.getConnection()
↳ com.alibaba.druid.pool.DruidDataSource.getConnection()
↳ com.alibaba.druid.pool.DruidDataSource.getConnectionDirect()
↳ com.alibaba.druid.pool.DruidDataSource.getConnectionInternal()
↳ com.alibaba.druid.pool.DruidDataSource.takeLast()
↳ com.alibaba.druid.pool.DruidDataSource.pollLast()
↳ com.alibaba.druid.pool.DruidDataSource$CreateConnectionThread.run()
↳ com.alibaba.druid.pool.DruidAbstractDataSource.createPhysicalConnection()
↳ com.alibaba.druid.pool.DruidAbstractDataSource.createPhysicalConnection()
↳ java.sql.Driver.connect()
```

Table 27: *com.alibaba.druid-1.2.24*

```
java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler.invoke()
↳ org.springframework.core.SerializableTypeWrapper$TypeProxyInvocationHandler.invoke()
↳ org.springframework.util.ReflectionUtils.invokeMethod()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke()
```

Table 28: *org.springframework.spring-core-6.1.17*

```
javax.naming.Context.lookup()
↳ org.apache.activemq.jndi.ReadOnlyContext.lookup()
↳ javax.naming.Context.lookup()
```

Table 29: *org.apache.activemq.activemq-client-6.1.5*. The interesting part is that `ReadOnlyContext` is serializable

```
javax.naming.Context.lookup()
↳ org.apache.camel.util.jndi.JndiContext.lookup()
↳ javax.naming.Context.lookup()
```

Table 30: *org.apache.camel.camel-core-2.25.4*

```
javax.sql.DataSource.getConnection()
↳ net.sourceforge.jtds.jdbcx.JtdsDataSource.getConnection()
↳ net.sourceforge.jtds.jdbcx.JtdsDataSource.getConnection(String, String)
↳ java.io.FileOutputStream.<init>()
```

Table 31: *net.sourceforge.jtds.jtds-1.2.8*

```
java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler.invoke()
↳ io.lettuce.core.dynamic.support.TypeWrapper$TypeProxyInvocationHandler.invoke()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke()
```

Table 32: *io.lettuce.lettuce-core-6.5.4*

```

javax.sql.DataSource.getConnection()
↳ org.apache.derby.client.BasicClientDataSource.getConnection()
↳ org.apache.derby.client.BasicClientDataSource.computeDnLogWriterForNewConnection()
↳ org.apache.derby.client.BasicClientDataSource.computeDnLogWriterForNewConnection()
↳ org.apache.derby.client.BasicClientDataSource.computeDnLogWriter()
↳ org.apache.derby.client.BasicClientDataSource.computePrintWriter()
↳ org.apache.derby.client.BasicClientDataSource.getPrintWriter()
↳ java.io.FileOutputStream.<init>()
    
```

Table 33: org.apache.derby.derbyclient-10.17.1.0

```

javax.xml.transform.Transformer newTransformer()
↳ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl.newTransformer()
↳ com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl.getTransletInstance()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Constructor.newInstance()
    
```

Table 34: xalan.xalan-2.7.3

C.4 Mixed

```

java.lang.Runnable.run()
↳ org.apache.hadoop.security.UserGroupInformation$AutoRenewalForUserCredsRunnable.run()
↳ org.apache.hadoop.security.UserGroupInformation$TicketCacheRenewalRunnable.relogin()
↳ org.apache.hadoop.util.Shell.execCommand(java.lang.String[])
↳ org.apache.hadoop.util.Shell.execCommand(java.util.Map, java.lang.String[], long)
↳ org.apache.hadoop.util.Shell$ShellCommandExecutor.execute()
↳ org.apache.hadoop.util.Shell.run()
↳ org.apache.hadoop.util.Shell.runCommand()
↳ java.lang.ProcessBuilder.<init>()
    
```

Table 35: org.apache.hadoop.hadoop-common-3.4.1

```

java.util.Hashtable.readObject()
↳ java.util.Hashtable.readHashtable()
↳ java.util.Hashtable.reconstitutionPut()
↳ java.net.URL.equals()
↳ org.eclipse.osgi.internal.url.MultiplexingURLStreamHandler.equals()
↳ org.eclipse.osgi.internal.url.MultiplexingURLStreamHandler.findAuthorizedURLStreamHandler()
↳ org.eclipse.osgi.internal.url.URLStreamHandlerFactoryImpl.findAuthorizedURLStreamHandler()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke()
    
```

Table 36: org.eclipse.platform.org.eclipse.osgi-3.22.0

```

java.lang.AutoCloseable.close()
↳ java.util.Hashtable.readHashtable()
↳ org.apache.poi.openxml4j.opc.OPCPackage.close()
↳ org.apache.poi.openxml4j.opc.ZipPackage.closeImpl()
↳ org.apache.poi.openxml4j.opc.OPCPackage.save()
↳ java.nio.file.Files.newOutputStream()
    
```

Table 37: org.apache.poi.poi-ooxml-5.4.0

```

java.awt.event.ActionListener.actionPerformed()
↳ org.h2.tools.GUIConsole.actionPerformed()
↳ org.h2.tools.GUIConsole.shutdown()
↳ org.h2.util.Utils.callMethod()
↳ org.h2.util.Utils.callMethod()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke()
    
```

Table 38: com.h2database.h2-2.3.232

```

java.lang.AutoCloseable.close()
↳ org.apache.hadoop.fs.store.DataBlocks$DataBlock.close()
↳ org.apache.hadoop.fs.store.DataBlocks$DiskBlock.innerClose()
↳ org.apache.hadoop.fs.store.DataBlocks$DiskBlock.closeBlock()
↳ java.io.File.delete()
    
```

Table 39: org.apache.hadoop.hadoop-common-3.4.1

```

java.lang.AutoCloseable.close()
↳ org.apache.cassandra.io.util.RewindableDataInputStreamPlus.close()
↳ org.apache.cassandra.io.util.RewindableDataInputStreamPlus.close(boolean)
↳ java.io.File.delete()
    
```

Table 40: org.apache.cassandra.cassandra-all-3.0.32

```

java.lang.Runnable.run()
↳ org.apache.logging.log4j.core.appender.rolling.action.AbstractAction.run()
↳ org.apache.logging.log4j.core.appender.rolling.action.ZipCompressAction.execute()
↳ org.apache.logging.log4j.core.appender.rolling.action.ZipCompressAction.execute()
↳ java.io.File.delete()
    
```

Table 41: org.apache.log4j.log4j-core-2.24.3

```

java.util.Iterator.hasNext()
↳ org.apache.openjpa.jdbc.meta.Strats.LRSPProxyMap$ResultIterator.hasNext()
↳ org.apache.openjpa.jdbc.sql.MergedResult.next()
↳ org.apache.openjpa.jdbc.sql.LogicalUnion$ResultComparator.getOrderingValue(Result, int)
↳ org.apache.openjpa.jdbc.sql.LogicalUnion$ResultComparator.getOrderingValue(Result, Object)
↳ org.apache.openjpa.jdbc.sql.PostgresDictionary.getObject()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke()
    
```

Table 42: org.apache.openjpa.openjpa-4.0.1

```

java.lang.Runnable.run()
↳ org.jgroups.protocols.MERGE3$InfoSender.run()
↳ org.jgroups.protocols.PDC.down()
↳ org.jgroups.protocols.PDC.writeNodeToDisk()
↳ org.jgroups.protocols.PDC.writeToTempFile()
↳ java.io.FileOutputStream.<init>()
    
```

Table 43: org.jgroups.jgroups-5.3.15

```

java.beans.PropertyChangeListener.propertyChange()
↳ org.apache.catalina.core.NamingContextListener.propertyChange()
↳ org.apache.catalina.core.NamingContextListener.processGlobalResourcesChange()
↳ org.apache.catalina.core.NamingContextListener.addEnvironment()
↳ org.apache.catalina.core.NamingContextListener.constructEnvEntry()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Constructor.newInstance()
    
```

Table 44: org.apache.tomcat.embed.tomcat-embed-core-10.1.36 and org.apache.tomcat.tomcat-catalina-10.1.36

```

java.util.Iterator.hasNext()
↳ org.python.core.WrappedIter.hasNext()
↳ org.python.modules.itertools.inap$1._iternext__()
↳ org.python.core.PyBuiltinMethodNarrow._call__()
↳ org.python.core.PyJavaType$14._call__()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke()
    
```

Table 45: org.python.jython-standalone-2.7.4

```

java.lang.Runnable.run()
↳ net.bytebuddy.ClassFileVersion$VersionLocator$Resolver.run()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke()
    
```

Table 46: net.bytebuddy.byte-buddy-1.17.1

```

java.util.Map.put()
↳ org.apache.commons.beanutils.BaseDynaBeanMapDecorator.put()
↳ org.apache.commons.beanutils.LazyDynaBean.get()
↳ org.apache.commons.beanutils.LazyDynaBean.createProperty()
↳ org.apache.commons.beanutils.LazyDynaBean.createOtherProperty()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Constructor.newInstance()
    
```

Table 47: commons-beanutils-1.10.1

```

java.io.Flushable.flush()
↳ org.springframework.integration.metadata.PropertiesPersistingMetadataStore.flush()
↳ org.springframework.integration.metadata.PropertiesPersistingMetadataStore.saveMetadata()
↳ java.io.FileOutputStream.<init>()
    
```

Table 48: spring-integration-core-6.3.8

```

java.util.Iterator.next()
↳ com.mysql.cj.xdevapi.AbstractDataResult.next()
↳ com.mysql.cj.protocol.ProtocolEntityFactory.createFromProtocolEntity()
↳ com.mysql.cj.exceptions.ExceptionFactory.createException()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Constructor.newInstance()
    
```

Table 49: com.mysql.mysql-connector-j-9.2.0

```

java.lang.AutoCloseable.close()
↳ org.apache.sshd.agent.unix.AgentServerProxy.close()
↳ org.apache.sshd.agent.unix.AgentServerProxy.removeSocketFile()
↳ org.apache.sshd.agent.unix.AgentServerProxy.deleteFile()
↳ java.io.File.delete()
    
```

Table 50: org.apache.sshd.sshd-core-2.14.0

```

java.lang.Runnable.run()
↳ org.apache.calcite.adapter.druid.DruidConnectionImpl$1.run()
↳ org.apache.calcite.adapter.druid.DruidConnectionImpl.request()
↳ org.apache.calcite.runtime.HttpUtils.post()
↳ org.apache.calcite.runtime.HttpUtils.executeMethod()
↳ org.apache.calcite.runtime.HttpUtils.getURLConnection()
↳ java.net.URL.openConnection()
    
```

Table 51: org.apache.hive.hive-exec-4.0.1

```

java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler.invoke()
↳ org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.ConversionHandler.invoke()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke()
    
```

Table 52: org.apache.groovy.groovy-4.0.25

```

java.lang.Iterable.iterator()
↳ com.google.javascript.jscomp.jarjar.org.apache.tools.ant.types.resources.Files.iterator()
↳ com.google.javascript.jscomp.jarjar.org.apache.tools.ant.types.ArchiveScanner.scan()
↳ com.google.javascript.jscomp.jarjar.org.apache.tools.ant.types.resources.URLResource.isExists()
↳ com.google.javascript.jscomp.jarjar.org.apache.tools.ant.types.resources.URLResource.isExists()
↳ com.google.javascript.jscomp.jarjar.org.apache.tools.ant.types.resources.URLResource.connect()
↳ java.net.URL.openConnection()
    
```

Table 53: com.google.javascript.closure-compiler-20240317

```

java.lang.Runnable.run()
↳ io.undertow.server.handlers.resource.URLResource$1ServerTask.run()
↳ java.net.URL.openStream()
    
```

Table 54: io.undertow.undertow-core-2.2.37

```

java.sql.Connection.isValid()
↳ com.clickhouse.jdbc.internal.ClickHouseConnectionImpl.isValid()
↳ com.clickhouse.client.AbstractClient.ping()
↳ com.clickhouse.client.http.ClickHouseHttpClient.checkHealth()
↳ com.clickhouse.client.http.HttpURLConnectionImpl.ping()
↳ com.clickhouse.client.http.HttpURLConnectionImpl.newConnection()
↳ java.net.URLConnection.openConnection()
    
```

Table 55: *com.clickhouse.clickhouse-jdbc-0.8.1*

```

java.lang.AutoCloseable.close()
↳ liquibase.database.core.DerbyDatabase.close()
↳ liquibase.database.core.DerbyDatabase.shutdownDerby()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Constructor.newInstance()
    
```

Table 56: *org.liquibase.liquibase-core-4.31.1*

```

java.util.Iterator.next()
↳ edu.stanford.nlp.objectbank.ReaderIteratorFactory$ReaderIterator.next()
↳ edu.stanford.nlp.objectbank.ReaderIteratorFactory$ReaderIterator.setNextObject()
↳ java.net.URL.openStream()
    
```

Table 57: *edu.stanford.nlp.stanford-corenlp-4.5.8*

```

java.util.Iterator.hasNext()
↳ org.eclipse.persistence.queries.ScrollableCursor.hasNext()
↳ org.eclipse.persistence.queries.ScrollableCursor.loadNext()
↳ org.eclipse.persistence.queries.ScrollableCursor.retrieveNextObject()
↳ org.eclipse.persistence.internal.queries.JoinedAttributeManager.processDataResults()
↳ org.eclipse.persistence.internal.descriptors.ObjectBuilder.extractPrimaryKeyFromRow()
↳ org.eclipse.persistence.internal.descriptors.ObjectBuilder.extractPrimaryKeyFromObject()
↳ org.eclipse.persistence.mappings.structures.NestedTableMapping.writeFromObjectIntoRow()
↳ org.eclipse.persistence.internal.databaseaccess.DataSourceAccessor.incrementCallCount()
↳ org.eclipse.persistence.internal.databaseaccess.DataSourceAccessor.connectInternal()
↳ org.eclipse.persistence.sessions.DataSourceLogin.connectToDataSource()
↳ org.eclipse.persistence.sessions.JNDIConnector.connect()
↳ javax.naming.Context.lookup()
    
```

Table 58: *org.eclipse.persistence.eclipselink-4.0.5*

```

java.util.Iterator.hasNext()
↳ org.hibernate.query.internal.ScrollableResultsIterator.hasNext()
↳ org.hibernate.internal.FetchingScrollableResultsImpl.next()
↳ org.hibernate.internal.FetchingScrollableResultsImpl.prepareCurrentRow()
↳ org.hibernate.sql.results.internal.StandardRowReader.readRow()
↳ org.hibernate.sql.results.internal.RowTransformerTupleTransformerAdapter.transformRow()
↳ org.hibernate.jpa.spi.NativeQueryConstructorTransformer.transformTuple()
↳ java.lang.reflect.Constructor.newInstance()
    
```

Table 59: *org.hibernate.orm.hibernate-core-6.6.8*

D Apache OpenJPA Payload Construction




Figure 6: Payload visualization for dormant *OpenJPA* gadget chain. Modifications are highlighted in green. Making *LRSProxyMap\$ResultIterator*, *MergedResult*, and *ResultSetResult* serializable requires only the addition of *Serializable* to *OpenJPA*'s *Closeable* since all three gadgets inherit from it. It illustrates quite well how changing the serializability of a single interface (or class) can have a substantial impact on its descendants. Additionally, we provide transitive serializability via *Configurable* and *MergedResults\$ResultComparator* to *PostgresDictionary* and *LogicalUnion\$ResultComparator*, respectively.

E Deserialization Filter

```

jdk.serialFilter=
!com.github.jknack.handlebars.io.URLTemplateSource;
!org.jfree.chart.axis.PeriodAxis;
!org.apache.flink.api.java.typeutils.runtime.kryo.KryoSerializer;
!org.rogach.scallop.SerializationProxy;
!org.springframework.beans.factory.support.DisposableBeanAdapter;
!org.htmlparser.beans.HTMLTextBean;
!org.apache.commons.dbcp2.datasources.InstanceKeyDataSource;
!org.mapdb.StoreTrivialTx;
!org.apache.openejb.threads.impl.ContextServiceImpl$CUHandler;
!org.apache.openejb.threads.impl.ContextServiceImpl$CUHandler.lambda$invoke$0;
!com.googlecode.aviator.runtime.function.ClassMethodFunction;
!oracle.jdbc.rowset.OracleCachedRowSet;
!org.hibernate.validator.internal.util.annotation.AnnotationProxy;
!org.redisson.mapreduce.CoordinatorTask;
!weka.experiment.CSVResultListener;
!org.apache.bval.jsr.util.AnnotationProxy;
!org.jdesktop.swing.action.ServerAction;
!org.apache.ibatis.logging.jdbc.ResultSetLogger;
!com.alibaba.druid.pool.DruidDataSource;
!org.springframework.core.SerializableTypeWrapper$TypeProxyInvocationHandler;
!org.apache.activemq.jndi.ReadOnlyContext;
!org.apache.camel.util.jndi.JndiContext;
!net.sourceforge.jtds.jdbc.JtdsDataSource;
!io.lettuce.core.dynamic.support.TypeWrapper$TypeProxyInvocationHandler;
!org.apache.derby.client.BasicClientDataSource;
!com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl;
!org.apache.hadoop.security.UserGroupInformation$AutoRenewalForUserCredsRunnable;
!org.apache.hadoop.security.UserGroupInformation$TicketCacheRenewalRunnable;
!org.eclipse.osgi.internal.url.URLStreamHandlerFactoryImpl;
!org.apache.poi.openxml4j.opc.OPCPackage;
!org.h2.tools.GUIConsole;
!org.apache.hadoop.fs.store.DataBlocks$DiskBlock;
!org.apache.cassandra.io.util.RewindableDataInputStreamPlus;
!org.apache.logging.log4j.core.appender.rolling.action.ZipCompressAction;
!org.apache.openjpa.jdbc.sql.PostgresDictionary;
!org.jgroups.protocols.PDC;
!org.apache.catalina.core.NamingContextListener;
!org.python.core.WrappedIterIterator;
!net.bytebuddy.ClassFileVersion$VersionLocator$Resolver;
!org.apache.commons.beanutils.LazyDynaBean;
!org.springframework.integration.metadata.PropertiesPersistingMetadataStore;
!com.mysql.cj.protocol.ProtocolEntityFactory;
!org.apache.sshd.agent.unix.AgentServerProxy;
!org.apache.calcite.adapter.druid.DruidConnectionImpl;
!org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.ConversionHandler;
!com.google.javascript.jscomp.jar.jar.org.apache.tools.ant.types.resources.URLResource;
!io.undertow.server.handlers.resource.URLResource$1ServerTask;
!com.clickhouse.client.http.HttpURLConnectionImpl;
!liqibase.database.core.DerbyDatabase;
!edu.stanford.nlp.objectbank.ReaderIteratorFactory$ReaderIterator;
!org.eclipse.persistence.internal.databaseaccess.DataSourceAccessor;
!org.hibernate.jpa.spi.NativeQueryConstructorTransformer;

```

Listing 18: Deserialization filter according to verified dormant gadget chains.

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